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INTRODUCTION
While the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides comprehensive
protection for people with disabilities in several areas of life, including
employment, questions about its scope and effectiveness remain. In addition to
problems completing tasks at the workplace, many individuals with disabilities
have difficulty getting to and from the workplace. Public transportation may be an
unavailable, or an unacceptable, solution because it is often unreliable and may
prevent an employee from getting to work on time. Employees with disabilities
may therefore be unable to get to work without commuting-related
accommodations and thus may be unable to keep their jobs though they are
otherwise qualified for the position.
Recently, courts have split over whether the ADA’s reasonable
accommodations framework imposes on employers an obligation to
accommodate employees’ commuting-related difficulties. Commuting-related
accommodations can range from requests for parking spaces1 and modified work
schedules on one end of the spectrum to employer-paid transportation and
telecommuting on the other. While cases involving requests for schedule changes2
and parking spaces have found success in the Second,3 Ninth,4 and Third5
Circuits, they have met resistance in other circuits, including the Seventh6 and
Eighth Circuits.7
Courts addressing requests for commuting-related accommodations have
split over whether these accommodations are outside the scope of the ADA. The
Seventh,8 Eighth,9 and Eleventh10 Circuits have held that commuting-related
accommodations are outside the scope of the ADA and are thus not required. The
Third Circuit also followed this approach prior to deciding Colwell v. Rite Aid in

1. Parking space accommodations have generally been treated by courts as commuting-related
because they are provided outside of the physical bounds of the workplace and often stem from an
employee’s inability to walk long distances. E.g., Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1516 (2d Cir.
1995).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2006) (listing “modified work schedules” as possible reasonable
accommodations).
3. See, e.g., Lyons, 68 F.3d at 1516 (finding a request for a parking space to be a reasonable
accommodation depending on certain factors).
4. See, e.g., Livingston v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 388 F. App’x 738, 741–43 (9th Cir. 2010)
(reversing summary judgment for the defendant employer and holding that a request for day shifts
could be reasonable under the circumstances).
5. See, e.g., Colwell v. Rite-Aid, 602 F.3d 495, 506 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding a request for day shifts
to be a reasonable accommodation).
6. See, e.g., Bull v. Coyner, No. 97 C. 7583, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1905, at *25 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
17, 2000).
7. See, e.g., Young-Parker v. AT&T, 4:09-CV-00202, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114997, at *5–8
(E.D. Ark. Apr. 29, 2009).
8. See, e.g., Bull, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1905, at *25.
9. See, e.g., Young-Parker, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114997.
10. See, e.g., Salmon v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
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2010.11 Since 2010, however, the Second,12 Third,13 and Ninth14 Circuits have
applied a flexible, case-by-case analysis that examines the requested
accommodation and conducts a fact-specific inquiry into the reasonableness of
providing such an accommodation.
A case-by-case approach to commuting-related accommodations is most
consistent with the language and purpose of the ADA’s Title I,15 which Congress
enacted to provide a comprehensive prohibition on discrimination against
individuals with disabilities in the workplace.16 This approach is also supported by
the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), wherein
Congress mandated a less rigid interpretation of the ADA and broader protections
for disabled individuals. It is imperative that courts use this case-by-case approach
if the goals of the ADA—providing equal opportunities to disabled individuals
and allowing such individuals to hold meaningful positions in society—are to be
achieved. A case-by-case approach is consistent with the intent and goals of the
ADA because it (1) forces employers to confront prejudices about employees with
disabilities by engaging in an interactive, solution-oriented process, (2) aids
employees with disabilities in achieving equal opportunities in terms of finances,
and (3) enables employees with disabilities to hold meaningful positions in society
by helping them access and retain gainful employment.
Section I of this Note discusses the intent, history, and framework of the
ADA as amended by the ADAAA and describes the case law and circuit split.
Section II analyzes both approaches with a particular focus on the history and
intent of the ADA; it argues that a case-by-case approach is the better approach
based on the history and intent of the ADA and the subsequent ADAAA. Section
III provides some guidance for implementing a case-by-case approach by
producing several examples of accommodations that should be presumed to be
reasonable, presumed to be unreasonable, or that should receive a fact-specific
analysis to determine reasonableness. Because this Note attempts only to resolve a
circuit split based on an analysis of the ADA’s legislative history and intent, it does
not address the policy arguments regarding whether employers should be
responsible for commuting-related accommodations; these arguments are complex

11. Colwell v. Rite-Aid, 602 F.3d 495 (3d Cir. 2010).
12. See, e.g., Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1516 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding a request for a
parking space to be a reasonable accommodation).
13. See, e.g., Colwell, 602 F.3d at 505–06 (finding that a request for day shifts could be a
reasonable accommodation).
14. See, e.g., Livingston v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 388 F. App’x 738, 740–42 (9th Cir. 2010)
(reversing summary judgment for the defendant employer and holding that a request for day shifts
could be reasonable under the circumstances).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006).
16. See, e.g., Livingston, 388 F. App’x at 740–42 (reversing summary judgment for the defendant
employer and holding that a request for day shifts could be reasonable under the circumstances).
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enough to require their own separate note and are beyond the scope of this
project.
I. HISTORY, INTENT, AND FRAMEWORK OF THE ADA
A. The Evolution of the ADA and Its Expansion Through the ADAAA
Congress enacted the ADA to ensure equality for individuals with disabilities
and to allow them to participate fully in society.17 As the first statute to provide a
comprehensive set of rights to all Americans with disabilities,18 the ADA both
prohibits discrimination in employment decisions and imposes on employers an
affirmative duty to provide reasonable accommodations to qualified individuals
with disabilities.19
Under the ADA, individuals with disabilities are persons whose disability
substantially limits a major life activity.20 Once the courts find a plaintiff statutorily
disabled, the plaintiff must bear the burden of proving that he or she is also
“qualified.” 21 Qualified individuals are persons who can perform the essential
functions of the job with or without the reasonable accommodations.22
Congress amended the ADA through the ADAAA in 2008 in response to a
line of Supreme Court cases that significantly limited the definition of a disability
under the ADA.23 The first of these cases was Sutton v. United Air Lines, in which
the Supreme Court held that mitigating measures must be taken into account
when determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity.24
The petitioners in Sutton were twin sisters suffering from severe myopia25
who had applied to be airline pilots and had been rejected because they did not
meet the uncorrected vision requirements. The Court held, however, that the
sisters were not substantially limited in a major life activity and thus not disabled
under the statute because they had 20/20 or better vision with corrective

17. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101; see also Melissa Ann Resslar, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin: A Hole in One
for Casey Martin and the ADA, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 631, 637 (2002) (noting that while the ADA was
not the first statute enacted to prevent discrimination against disabled individuals, it is considered the
“first comprehensive declaration of equality” for disabled individuals).
18. Resslar, supra note 17, at 637.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006).
20. Id. § 12102 .
21. Debra Burke & Malcom Abel, Ameliorating Medication and ADA Protection: Use It and Lose It
or Refuse It and Lose It?, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 785, 816–17 (2001); see id. § 12111 (2006) (defining “qualified
individual”); id. § 12112 (prohibiting discrimination against a qualified individual).
22. Id. § 12111.
23. Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. P.L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122
Stat. 3553 (findings and purpose section).
24. Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
25. Id. at 475.
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measures.26 Moreover, although the Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission (EEOC) had issued interpretive guidance stating that disabilities
should be assessed without reference to any mitigating measures, the Court noted
that under the ADA, the EEOC did not have authority to issue these guidelines.27
In dicta, the Court questioned the deference due to the EEOC regulations and
reserved this question for a later date.28
The Court further narrowed the definition of a disability under the ADA in
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams. First, the Court held that the
appropriate inquiry for determining disability, defined as whether an individual is
substantially limited in a major life activity, is whether an individual’s impairment
has “prevented or restricted [him or her] from performing tasks that are of central
importance to most people’s daily lives.”29 The Court also held that in order to
qualify as a disability, the “impairment’s impact must . . . be permanent or long
term.”30
The plaintiff in Toyota was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome
and bilateral tendinitis, which limited her ability to lift and carry objects weighing
more than a certain amount.31 The Court held that the plaintiff was not disabled
under the statute32 and that Congress intended a “demanding standard for
qualifying as disabled.”33 In doing so, it reasoned that if Congress meant to include
all individuals with physical limitations, then the ADA’s findings section would
cite a much higher number of individuals with disabilities then it did.34
In response, Congress enacted the ADAAA in 2008, which legislatively
overruled Sutton and Toyota by expanding the types of disabilities that are covered
by the ADA.35 The ADAAA also expressed Congress’s disapproval of the strict
interpretation and exacting standards that the Supreme Court and lower courts
following Toyota and Sutton had imposed on ADA plaintiffs attempting to prove
their disability.36 First, Congress provided that the ADAAA’s purpose is
to convey that it is the intent of Congress that the primary object of
attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities
covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations, and to

26. Id. at 481–82.
27. Id. at 479.
28. Id. at 480.
29. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 187 (2002).
30. Id. at 198.
31. Id. at 187–88.
32. Id. at 187.
33. Id. at 197.
34. Id. at 197–98.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006); see also Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans
with Disabilities Act, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217 (2008).
36. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554
(2008).
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convey that the question of whether an individual’s impairment is a
disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis.37
Further, the ADAAA expanded the nonexclusive list of major life activities
to encompass, for example, several major bodily functions.38
Although the ADAAA clarified Congress’s intent with regard to the
definition of a disability under the ADA, and even included walking as a major life
activity, it nevertheless left many other questions open, including whether driving
is a major life activity and whether commuting-related accommodations are within
the scope of the statute.39 Despite this, Congress’s statement of intent in
amending the ADA was a clear endorsement of a broader, more inclusive
interpretation of the statute.40
B. Intent
In drafting the ADA, Congress found that individuals with disabilities
“occupy an inferior status in our society” and traditionally experience isolation and
segregation.41 Congress further found that individuals with disabilities face
frequent and pervasive discrimination that denies these individuals the
“opportunity to compete on an equal basis” and costs the United States “billions
of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and
nonproductivity.”42
As a result of these findings, Congress intended the ADA to “provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.”43 The ADA was further intended to “provide broad
coverage”44 to individuals with disabilities in the hope that these individuals would
have the opportunity to become productive and successful members of society.45
In order to achieve the statutory goal of equal opportunities for individuals
with disabilities, courts should adopt a case-by-case approach to commutingrelated accommodations. If employees with disabilities cannot get to the
workplace, then providing reasonable accommodations inside the workplace does
little to ensure equal opportunities. Moreover, allowing employers to dismiss all
requests that resemble commuting-related accommodations does nothing to end
discrimination—in fact, it may even perpetuate the stereotypes that the ADA was
meant to end.
37. Id.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
39. See id.
40. See ADA Amendments Act, § 4, 122 Stat. at 3555–57 (2008); see also Joseph A. Seiner,
Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95, 108 (2010).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. ADA Amendments Act, 122 Stat. 3553.
45. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 24 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 313.
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C. Framework and Case Law
Courts have adopted three approaches to cases on commuting-related
accommodations: (1) holding that the individual is not disabled because driving is
not a major life activity,46 (2) holding that commuting-related accommodations are
outside the scope of the ADA,47 and (3) holding that commuting-related
accommodations can be reasonable under the circumstances.48 This Note does
not discuss the holding—that driving is not a major life activity—because the
issue of disability under the statute is separate from the reasonableness of an
accommodation. Discussion here will focus on the concept of disability under the
ADA only to the extent that Congress’s amendment of the original definition of
disability through the ADAAA provides support for a broader reading of the
statute itself.
This Note assumes that an employee who requests a commuting-related
accommodation is disabled under the ADA, and addresses only the circuit split
over whether this accommodation is within the scope of the ADA based on the
legislative history and intent of the statute. This Note then argues that courts
should adopt a case-by-case approach to commuting-related accommodations as
the approach that is most consistent with the intent and goals of the ADA.
1. Reasonable Accommodations Overview
In addition to prohibiting discrimination in employment decisions, the ADA
imposes on employers an affirmative duty to provide reasonable accommodations
for the known limitations of employees with disabilities49 unless providing the
accommodations would create undue hardship.50 Before the court will perform an
inquiry into the reasonableness of an accommodation, however, the plaintiff must
show that he or she is qualified for the position under the ADA.51 A qualified

46. See, e.g., Winsley v. Cook Cnty., 563 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2009); Kellogg v. Energy Safety
Servs. Inc., 544 F.3d 1121, 1124–26 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that a safety technician who had
epilepsy and was not released to drive was not a disabled individual under the ADA because driving
was not a major life activity, as its importance significantly depended on factors such as nearness to
transportation); Chenoweth v. Hillsborough Cnty., 250 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2001).
47. See, e.g., Bull v. Coyner, No. 98 C. 7583, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1905, at *25 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
17, 2000); Salmon v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (S.D. Fla. 1998); Schneider v. Cont’l
Cas. Co., No. 95 C. 1820, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19631 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 1996).
48. See e.g., Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1516 (2d Cir. 1995); Colwell v. Rite Aid
Corp., 602 F.3d 495 (3d Cir. 2010); Livingston v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., No. 08-35597, 388 F.
App’x 738 (9th Cir. 2010).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006).
50. Id.; Elizabeth Clark Morin, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Social Integration Through
Employment, 40 CATH. U.L. REV. 189, 199 (1990).
51. Burke & Abel, supra note 21; see 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2006) (defining “qualified individual”);
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (prohibiting discrimination against a qualified individual).
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individual can perform the essential functions of the job with or without
reasonable accommodations.52
The qualified individual inquiry is a very complicated area of the ADA
analysis because every position requires a different set of essential functions. For
some jobs, it is essential to be able to arrive on time, which can be difficult for
people dependent on public transportation. People with disabilities are often
dependent on public transportation because their disabilities prevent them from
driving.53 For these jobs, an individual with disabilities may not be classified as a
qualified individual because he or she cannot perform essential job functions even
with accommodations. In order to decide this issue, courts must apply a case-bycase analysis of the job specifics, the tasks required, and the accommodations
requested.
The last and arguably most important component of the ADA framework is
the reasonable accommodations provision.54 An employer is required to provide
reasonable accommodations to employees with disabilities,55 which may include
“making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible . . . and usable,”56
as well as offering the option of “job restructuring, part-time or modified work
schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,” and other statutory
accommodations.57 Determining whether an accommodation is reasonable
requires a case by case analysis.58 The ADA does not require a plaintiff to prove
that an accommodation falls within an employer’s obligations under the statute as
an element of the cause of action. This suggests that Congress intended the
employer to bear the burden of proving that the accommodation falls outside its
statutory obligations as an affirmative defense.
An employer may, however, reject a reasonable accommodation if the
accommodation causes undue hardship,59 which the ADA defines as subjecting
the employer to “significant difficulty or expense” when considered in light of a
number of factors in the statute.60 Courts that reached the issue of reasonableness
in commuting-related accommodation cases have adopted one of the following

52. 42 U.S.C. § 12111.
53. See Michael Lewyn, “Thou Shalt Not Put a Stumbling Block Before the Blind”: The Americans with
Disabilities Act and Public Transit for the Disabled, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1037 (2001).
54. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 34 (noting that the “provision of various types of
reasonable accommodations for individuals with various types of disabilities is essential to
accomplishing the critical goal of this legislation—to allow individuals with disabilities to be part of
the economic mainstream of our society”).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 12111.
57. Id.
58. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 49; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d), app. (2012); Jeffrey O.
Cooper, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1457 (1991).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 12111.
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two approaches: (1) holding that commuting-related accommodations are outside
the scope of the ADA,61 or (2) holding that commuting-related accommodations
may be reasonable under the circumstances.62 The case-by-case approach is most
consistent with the ADA’s legislative history and purpose.
2. Not Required by the ADA
Some courts decide ADA claims that involve commuting issues by holding
that commuting is outside the scope of employers’ statutory obligations. Courts
using this approach assert that the ADA addresses discrimination with respect to
the “terms, condition, or privilege of employment.”63 Finding that commuting
falls outside the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because
commuting is outside the bounds of the physical workplace, these courts thus find
that employers are not required to accommodate such commuting issues under
the ADA. While the two key Seventh Circuit cases that adopted this approach
were not the first to hold that problems outside the workplace do not require
accommodation, they are generally cited for the proposition that commutingrelated accommodations are outside the scope of the ADA.
The Seventh Circuit first adopted this approach in Schneider v. Continental
Casualty Company.64 The plaintiff was a loss control representative who suffered
from severe back pain that prevented her from driving the one-hour commute to
her position. Citing to an opinion letter from the EEOC’s Deputy General
Counsel, which stated that employers are only required to provide reasonable
accommodations that eliminate barriers inside the work environment, and not
those external to the work environment, the court held that the defendant was not
required to accommodate the plaintiff’s commuting-related difficulties because
they occur outside the work environment.65
The Seventh Circuit then affirmed this approach in Bull v. Conyer.66 The
plaintiff was a human resources director who was diagnosed with retinitis
pigmentosa, a condition that rendered him legally blind and completely prevented
him from driving.67 After the plaintiff was terminated, he filed an ADA suit
asserting that his employer had failed to reasonably accommodate his disability by

61. See, e.g., Bull v. Coyner, No. 98 C. 7583, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1905, at *25 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
17, 2000); Salmon v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (S.D. Fla. 1998); Schneider v. Cont’l
Cas. Co., No. 95 C. 1820, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19631 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 1996).
62. See, e.g., Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495 (3d Cir. 2010); Livingston v. Fred Meyer
Stores, Inc., 388 F. App’x 738 (9th Cir. 2010); Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1516 (2d Cir.
1995).
63. Bull, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1905, at *25 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112).
64. Schneider, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19631.
65. Id. at *24.
66. Bull, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1905, at *25.
67. Id. at *3.
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continuing to give him night shifts and by not requiring other employees to drive
him to and from work.68
The Bull court reasoned that because accommodations are directed at
enabling an employee to perform the essential functions of the job, and because
commuting to and from work is outside the scope of the job, commuting-related
accommodations are outside the scope of the employer’s obligations under the
ADA.69 After holding that both of the plaintiff’s requested accommodations were
essentially commuting-related, the court held that the defendant had no obligation
to provide them.70
Citing to Schneider, a district court in the Eleventh Circuit also held that
commuting-related problems are outside the scope of the employer’s obligations
under the ADA.71 In Salmon v. Dade County School Board, the Eleventh Circuit ruled
that a plaintiff who suffered from a condition that caused her severe back pain
and left her unable to drive for long periods was not entitled to a transfer to
shorten her commute. Because the commute was a barrier outside of the work
environment, the court reasoned that the plaintiff’s request need not be
accommodated.72
Similarly, several Third Circuit courts cited to Bull or Schneider in order to
hold that commuting-related problems are outside the scope of the employer’s
obligations under the ADA.73 In LaResca v. American Telephone & Telegraph, a Third
Circuit district court held that an employer did not have an obligation to provide
only day shifts to an employee who suffered from epilepsy and was unable to
drive, despite the fact that he could not find any transportation to work at night.74
Although the LaResca plaintiff filed suit under the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (LAD), the court noted that the same framework that is used for
interpreting the ADA is also used for interpreting the LAD.75 Citing to Bull,
Schneider, and Salmon, the court held that “activities such as commuting to and
from work fall outside the scope of the job and are therefore not within the scope
of an employer’s obligations under the ADA.”76
In Parker v. Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc., the Third Circuit held once again that an
employer had no duty to transfer an employee in order to shorten his commute
68. Id. at *24.
69. Id. at *24–25.
70. Id.
71. Salmon v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
72. Id. at 1163.
73. Parker v. Verizon Pa., Inc., 309 F. App’x 551 (3d. Cir. 2009); Dicino v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare, No. 01-3206, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26487, at *51–52 (D. N.J. June 23, 2003) (holding
that the employer need not accommodate the plaintiff’s requests to work from home because
employers are not required to accommodate commuting-related problems); LaResca v. Am. Tel. &
Tel., 161 F. Supp. 2d 323, 333–34 (D. N.J. 2001).
74. LaResca, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 333.
75. Id. at 334.
76. Id. The court offered little reasoning other than citing to cases that used this approach.
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because this barrier existed outside the work environment.77 Instead of explaining
its reasoning, the court cited to LaResca, which adopted the Seventh Circuit’s
reasoning in Bull and Schneider, to support the proposition that commuting-related
accommodations are outside the scope of the ADA.78
Likewise, an Arkansas district court held that even if an employee’s request
for only day shifts was a required accommodation under the ADA, it was
unreasonable.79 In Young-Parker v. AT&T, the plaintiff suffered from severe
fibromyalgia, a degenerative joint condition that prevented her from driving at
night. The court noted that while the Eighth Circuit did not address “whether an
accommodation related to an employee’s commute is required under the ADA,”
other circuits held that this accommodation was not required. The court also held
that even if the employee’s commuting-related problems were within the
employer’s obligations under the ADA, the plaintiff’s request was unreasonable
because it would prevent the employer from offering day shifts to other, more
qualified individuals who had seniority.80
3. Case-by-Case Reasonableness Under the Circumstances
Other courts address these cases by holding that commuting-related
accommodations may be reasonable under the circumstances. This approach is
most consistent with the ADA’s text and may, in fact, be necessary to realize its
goals. Far fewer cases, however, have adopted a case-by-case reasonableness
approach, although the majority of these cases arose or were decided within the
last several years.
One of the first cases holding that commuting-related accommodations
could be reasonable under the circumstances was Lyons v. Legal Aid Society, which
involved an attorney employed by the Legal Aid Society in lower Manhattan who
was struck by an automobile that inflicted near-fatal injuries and severely limited

77. Parker, 309 F App’x at 561. In Parker, the plaintiff was diagnosed with sarcoidosis, an
autoimmune disease causing pulmonary inflammation and fibrosis. His condition affected his ability
to breathe and talk and made it difficult for him to commute long distances. After his request for a
transfer was denied, he filed suit under the ADA. The court cited Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 53
(1st Cir. 2001), in support of its holding that an employee’s commute is not part of the work
environment and that an employer is not reasonably required to accommodate commuting-related
difficulties.
78. See id.
79. Young-Parker v. AT&T, No. 4:09-CV-00202, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114997 (E.D. Ark.
Apr. 29, 2009).
80. While the court did not say that commuting-related accommodations are always
unreasonable, shift changes impose relatively little hardship on employers facing requests to
accommodate their employees’ commuting-related problems. If the court found this request to be
unreasonable, then it is hard to imagine a request that it would consider reasonable.
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her ability to walk long distances. 81 The attorney asked the Legal Aid Society to
pay for a parking space near her office and the court where she worked.82
The lower court in Lyons held that the ADA did not impose this obligation
on employers and dismissed her complaint.83 However, the Second Circuit
reversed the dismissal, noting that “[i]t [was] clear . . . that Congress envisioned
that employer assistance with transportation to get the employee to and from the
job might be covered.”84 The court held that determining the reasonableness of
such accommodations would require the development of a factual record and
should be done on a flexible, case-specific basis.
Lyons paved the way for other courts to hold that commuting-related
accommodations can be reasonable under the circumstances.85 In 2010, the Third
Circuit held in Colwell v. Rite-Aid that “under certain circumstances the ADA can
obligate an employer to accommodate an employee’s disability-related difficulties
in getting to work, if reasonable.”86 In Colwell, an employee developed blindness in
one eye and requested day shifts to avoid driving at night.
The district court held that employers had no duty to accommodate
commuting-related issues and granted summary judgment for the defendant.87 The
Third Circuit reversed, however, noting that one circumstance where an employer
may have a duty to accommodate an employee’s commuting-related difficulties is
where the “condition . . . is entirely within an employer’s control.”88
The Ninth Circuit followed Colwell’s reasoning in Livingston v. Fred Meyer
Stores, Inc.89 In Livingston, the plaintiff was a wine steward who suffered from a
vision impairment that left her unable to safely drive and walk outside at night.90
She requested a modified work schedule to avoid driving at night during the fall
and winter. Her employer granted her request the first year but denied it the
second year; she refused to work her scheduled shifts and was fired.

81. Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1516 (2d Cir. 1995). The court also stated that
there was nothing unreasonable about requiring employers to offer reasonable accommodations to
otherwise qualified individuals in order to assist them in getting to work.
82. Id. at 1513.
83. Id. at 1514.
84. Id. at 1516. The court also stated that there was nothing unreasonable about requiring
employers to make reasonable accommodations to assist otherwise-qualified individuals in getting to
work. Id.
85. See Carrie G. Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms—Reasonable Accommodation and Resistance Under
the ADA, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 59, 94 (“Lyons has cleared a rough-hewn path towards
introducing other transportation-related reasonable accommodations.”).
86. Colwell v. Rite-Aid, 602 F.3d 495, 505 (3d Cir. 2010).
87. Id. at 499–500.
88. Id. at 505. The court noted in dicta that Colwell did not render employers responsible for
how employees travel to work because the plaintiff did not ask for help in the methods or means of
her commute. Id. at 506.
89. Livingston v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 388 F. App’x 738 (9th Cir. 2010).
90. Id. at 739.
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The district court declined to require an employer to accommodate
commuting-related limitations.91 The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the lower
court’s grant of summary judgment and noted that modified work schedules are
listed as reasonable accommodations under the ADA.92 Further, it held that the
plaintiff raised a triable issue of material fact on whether the defendant failed to
reasonably accommodate her. In so doing, the court “recognized that an employer
has a duty to accommodate an employee’s limitations in getting to and from
work.”93
II. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPER METHOD FOR ADDRESSING COMMUTINGRELATED ACCOMMODATIONS
Based on an analysis of the ADA’s legislative intent, the best approach to
commuting-related accommodations is the case-by-case approach implemented in
Colwell and Livingston. By providing that the “definition of disability in this Act
shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this Act,”94 the
ADA as amended by the ADAAA clearly indicates Congress’s intent for courts to
adopt a broader definition of the term “disability” than the one adopted following
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Toyota and Sutton. Congress’s broadening of this
definition and its instruction to courts to focus on whether employers have
fulfilled their obligations under the ADA (rather than on whether the individual is
disabled) can be seen as a broader instruction to courts to focus on the overall
intent and goals of the ADA instead of finding ways to quickly dispose of cases.
The ADAAA also conveys that ADA cases should emphasize whether an
employer upheld its obligations under the ADA rather than whether an employee
is disabled under the statute.95
Additionally, the ADA’s purpose is to enable individuals with disabilities to
become productive members of society through the enjoyment of equal
opportunities.96 It is not enough to provide reasonable accommodations to
individuals with disabilities inside the workplace without providing reasonable
accommodations that allow disabled individuals to reach the workplace. After
discussing the implications of the circuit split described in Section I above, this
Section explains why a bright-line rule that excludes commuting-related
accommodations as outside the scope of the ADA leads to the wrong result and
why a case-by-case approach that examines the reasonableness of the
accommodations under the circumstances leads to the correct result.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 740.
Id. at 740–41 (citing Colwell, 602 F.3d at 506).
Id. at 740.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(4) (2006).
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4, 122 Stat. 3553, 3559 (2008).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
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A. Commuting-Related Accommodations Should Not Be Outside the Scope of the ADA
The approach to commuting-related accommodations that holds them to be
outside the scope of the ADA, or per se unreasonable, ignores the intent and
purpose of the statute. In the House Notes on the ADA, Congress
“acknowledged that ‘modified work schedules can provide useful
accommodations’ and noted that ‘persons who may require modified work
schedules are persons with mobility impairments who depend on a public
transportation system that is not currently fully accessible.’”97 In its Interpretive
Guidance on Title I of the ADA, the EEOC also noted that “[p]eople whose
disabilities may need modified work schedules include . . . people with mobility
and other impairments who find it difficult to use public transportation during
peak hours, or who must depend upon special para-transit schedules.”98
Additionally, the EEOC specifically stated that required accommodations might
include “making employer provided transportation accessible, and providing
reserved parking spaces.”99 Further, a House of Representatives Committee on
Education and Labor report noted that an employee with disabilities who worked
in an inaccessible shopping mall was entitled to employer assistance in getting to
and from the job site.100 Quoting this language, the Colwell court reasoned that the
ADA does not “strictly limit the breadth of reasonable accommodations to
address only those problems that an employee has in performing her work that
arise once she arrives at the workplace.”101 Instead, the statute provides that
reasonable accommodations may include “part-time or modified work
schedules.”102 Because the ADA explicitly includes modified work schedules as
possible reasonable accommodations, and because modified work schedules are

97. Colwell v. Rite Aid, 602 F.3d 495, 505 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2,
at 62–63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345). For more examples of courts associating
modified work schedules with commuting-related accommodations, see Livingston, 388 F. App’x 738
(reversing the lower court’s finding that a modified work schedule request was a commuting-related
difficulty that was outside the scope of the ADA), LaResca v. American Telelephone & Telegraph, 161 F.
Supp. 2d 323, 333 (D.N.J. 2001) (rejecting the employee’s request for only daytime shifts on the
grounds that it was a commuting-related accommodation and thus outside the scope of the ADA),
and Bull v. Coyner, No. 98 C. 7583, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1905, at *24–25 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 17, 2000)
(rejecting an employee’s request for a modified work schedule on the grounds that it was a
commuting-related accommodation).
98. EEOC, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS
(TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT § III-3.10(3) (1992).
99. EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630, app. at 376 (2010).
100. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 61 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 343. The
House Report did not note whether the employee would be entitled to assistance to a specific store or
how that employee should be assisted. But it did note that the employer should determine whether
the individual with disabilities was qualified for the position and could reach the job site with a
reasonable accommodation.
101. Colwell, 602 F.3d at 505.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2006).
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often associated with commuting-related difficulties, courts may infer that
Congress contemplated commuting-related accommodations when enacting the
statute.103 That Congress did not list other possible commuting-related
accommodations does not negate the fact that it referenced parking spaces and
modified work schedules, both of which are often associated with commutingrelated difficulties.
Thus, based on the statutory language, the House Notes, and the EEOC’s
Interpretive Guidance on the statute, it is clear that both Congress and the EEOC
have recognized that commuting-related accommodations may be reasonable
under the circumstances. Holding them automatically outside the scope of
employers’ obligations is therefore contrary to what Congress and the EEOC have
envisioned.104 Moreover, the findings section of the ADA provides that “the
Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality
of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic selfsufficiency for such individuals.”105 Congress crafted the ADA with these findings
in mind. It could not accomplish these goals, however, if the statute only covered
disability-related problems inside the workplace because the resulting
accommodations would be useless to individuals with disabilities who could not
even access the workplace.
The findings section of the ADA also provides that
the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and
prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on
an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free
society is justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars
in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity.106
If the inability of individuals with disabilities to travel to and from the workplace
prevents them from holding productive jobs, they will be unable to compete on an
equal basis. They will continue to be dependent on the United States government
for support. Thus, accommodating only those problems that are confined to the
physical bounds of the workplace would not realize the goal of assuring full
participation and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities.
Because this method would exclude many individuals who might be able to hold a
meaningful job but for their inability to reach the workplace, these individuals
would be unable to fully participate in society and become economically selfsufficient.

103. See Colwell, 602 F.3d at 505.
104. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 62–63 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 330, 345.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006).
106. Id.
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Moreover, the ADA has never required employees to demonstrate that their
requested accommodations are within the scope of the ADA or employers’
obligations under the statute. Adding this requirement would mean that employees
must not only demonstrate (1) that they have a disability under the ADA, (2) that
they can perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable
accommodations, and (3) that their requested accommodations are reasonable, but
also (4) that their request is within their employer’s obligations under the ADA.
This is unnecessary because the existing framework already limits
accommodations that cause undue hardships for employers.107 Adding this
requirement would increase the already strenuous burden on plaintiffs and
improperly shift the employer’s burden of asserting the affirmative defense of
undue hardship onto employees with disabilities.
B. Why a Case-by-Case Approach Is Proper
The correct approach to commuting-related accommodations is the case-bycase approach adopted by the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits. This approach
conforms most closely to the intent and purpose of the Act and best achieves a
balance between the interests of employers and employees.
The EEOC’s guidance states that the reasonable accommodations analysis is
a fact-specific inquiry that is performed on a case by case basis.108 An employer
cannot determine reasonableness without examining the employee’s capabilities
and qualifications, the essential functions of the job, and the implementation costs
of the accommodation.
As discussed earlier, the ADAAA clarified that Congress intended the ADA
to provide broad coverage in order to promote equal opportunities and “address
the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.”109
If the statute is not construed to provide broad coverage, then prejudice will
continue to prevent individuals with disabilities from participating fully in society.
Compared to the per se rule, a case-by-case approach is more in line with the
broad coverage that Congress intended.
Further, in the ADA’s findings section, Congress provided:
[I]ndividuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of
discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the
discriminatory
effects
of
architectural,
transportation,
and
communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make
modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification

107. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006).
108. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. (2012); see H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 49, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314; Cooper, supra note 58, at 1457.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 12101.

UCILR V2I3 Assembled v8 (Do Not Delete)

2012]

12/14/2012 5:35 PM

COMMUTING ACCOMODATIONS UNDER THE ADA

1039

standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services,
programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities.110
These findings reflect the ADA’s purpose of mandating the “elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”111 If an employer denies an
employee’s request for accommodations before making fact-specific inquiries,
then its decision is likely to be arbitrary or biased. The reasonable
accommodations framework is best for achieving the ADA’s goals because it
instead forces employers to assess employees with disabilities on the basis of their
merit.112
Essentially, a policy that excludes all commuting-related accommodations
without regard for whether the accommodations are reasonable allows employers
to fire their employees on the basis of their disabilities through a statutory
loophole. By contrast, a policy that compels a case-by-case evaluation of
commuting-related accommodations requires employers to judge their employees
on the basis of their qualifications.
Additionally, a case-by-case approach best achieves a balance between the
competing interests of employers and employees. Under this approach, employees
can attempt to show that their commuting-related accommodations are reasonable
under the circumstances. This does not mean, however, that employers must grant
requested accommodations. Instead, employers can attempt to show that the
accommodations are unduly burdensome or that they eliminate an essential job
function.113
When an employer successfully shows that a commuting-related
accommodation is unreasonable—for instance, when the requested
accommodation subverts an established seniority system114—the employer should
have no duty to grant it.115 But before an employer can refuse an accommodation,
it should be required to consider the request under the ADA framework to
determine that it is, in fact, unreasonable.

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Basas, supra note 85, at 113 (“[A]n employer short-changes the interactive process
when she automatically concludes that an accommodation is outside the scope of the company’s
operations, without creating a dialogue with the employee about alternatives and her sources of
concern.”).
113. See Colwell v. Rite-Aid, 602 F.3d 495, 506 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying a case-by-case
approach to commuting-related accommodations, but noting that the employer had not argued that
the requested accommodation created undue hardship and that “those questions are ultimately for the
jury”).
114. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 394 (2002) (noting that an employer is not
ordinarily required to assign a employee with a disability to a position that another employee is
entitled to hold under an established seniority system; the employee with a disability has the burden of
showing that the requested accommodation is nonetheless reasonable).
115. See id.
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A case-by-case approach will also not significantly broaden the scope of
employers’ obligations or cause much uncertainty. Admittedly, this approach
requires employers to invest more effort in examining commuting-related
accommodations. Specifically, employers may need to assess more factors in
determining the reasonableness of accommodations outside the physical
workplace than inside the workplace, where the circumstances are entirely within
their control. Additionally, they will need to offer more accommodations than if
commuting-related difficulties were automatically considered outside the scope of
their obligations under the ADA.
A case-by case approach to requests for accommodations outside the
workplace, however, follows the same framework as requests for accommodations
inside the workplace. Thus, by carefully analyzing the requested accommodations,
employers will equally be able to determine which commuting-related
accommodations and non-commuting related accommodations are reasonable or
unreasonable. They will also be able to assert the defense of undue hardship or
argue that a commuting-related accommodation will eliminate an essential job
function. Therefore, a case-by-case approach will merely be consistent with the
framework already applied to requests for accommodations inside the workplace
and will not radically change the scope of employers’ duties under the ADA.
Finally, a case-by-case approach is the only approach that avoids drawing
arbitrary doctrinal lines. It is irrational to hold that modifications to the
architecture of a building can be reasonable116 while simultaneously holding that
parking spaces or shift changes are per se unreasonable or beyond the scope of
the ADA. Ending an employer’s statutory obligations at the doorway to the
workplace is illogical because of the absence of a principled justification for
providing elevators inside the building, but not parking spaces directly outside it.
A case-by-case approach avoids the meaningless distinction between the elevator
and the adjacent parking area and draws a more rational line at whether or not an
accommodation is reasonable.
C. Benefits and Drawbacks of a Case-by-Case Approach
Although the flexible case-by-case approach is best for addressing
commuting-related accommodations, it is not without drawbacks. While this
approach allows courts to assess the needs of individuals with disabilities more
closely, it also compels employers to examine more factors and litigate more cases.
Suits that would never be litigated, or would be dismissed early under a bright-line
rule, may be fully litigated under a case-by-case-approach. Considering the length
and cost of many ADA cases, employers may thus be forced to expend valuable
resources on litigation when they could have used these resources to
accommodate their employees. Thus, a bright-line rule that excludes commuting116.

42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2006).
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related accommodations or labels them inherently unreasonable may allow
employers to better anticipate which requested accommodations must be granted.
This would enable employers to better allocate their resources.
However, a case-by-case approach counters these drawbacks by allowing
courts to prevent discrimination while also better meeting the needs of individuals
with disabilities. While this approach does expand the scope of employers’ ADA
obligations and associated litigation costs, it does not impose a new, unfamiliar
standard; employers already interpret the reasonable accommodations framework
for problems occurring inside the workplace. And, while it is true that this
approach may increase the costs of litigation, all statutes that provide a group with
rights and a means to sue to protect those rights increase litigation. The need for
statutes protecting suppressed minorities outweighs the risk of increased litigation
expenses.117
Additionally, a case-by-case approach may increase the courts’ docket loads.
Instead of granting early dismissals in commuting-related cases, such as on a
motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment, courts will generally need to
allow more fact gathering. Again, however, courts will not be forced to apply a
new, unfamiliar standard because courts already apply the reasonable
accommodations framework to problems occurring inside the workplace. Further,
while efficiency and workload are certainly valid considerations, they are
outweighed by the compelling individual rights at stake.
Finally, one might ask why employers (not the government or the employees
with disabilities themselves) should be responsible for commuting-related costs.
Because this Note does not argue for an extension of already existing law, but
instead argues that commuting-related accommodations are within the scope of
the ADA, it assumes that Congress has already made this policy determination and
attempts only to resolve a circuit split based on an in-depth look into the ADA’s
legislative history and intent.
III. GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING A CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH
The ADA itself provides little guidance on defining reasonable
accommodations. However, the EEOC has issued its own regulations on the

117. It is important to consider the argument that construing the ADA more broadly will
create a backlash, prompting employers to hesitate to hire disabled employees. While the ADA
prohibits employers from discriminating against disabled employees in employment decisions, many
scholars question the effectiveness of the ADA and its reasonable accommodations framework. For
a discussion of the relevant competing literature, see Robert C. Bird & John D. Knopf, Do Disability
Laws Impair Firm Performance?, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 145, 168–82 (2010); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos,
The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 20 (2004) (noting that certain commentators argue that
the ADA increases unemployment for individuals with disabilities because the cost of
accommodations has created an incentive for employers to refuse to hire them, and that this problem
is compounded by the fact that the ADA’s antidiscrimination provisions are difficult to enforce at the
hiring stage).
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subject,118 and courts addressing commuting-related accommodations under the
case-by-case approach have assessed several factors in making their
determinations.119 First, courts should investigate the costs of the accommodation
to the employer.120 Next, they should assess the employer’s financial resources,
including all available outside funding.121 Further, they should inspect the
employer’s geographic location.122 Since these factors are not exclusive, courts
may consider other similar factors, including the type of operation, the impact of
the accommodation on other employees, and the impact of the accommodation
on the facility.123 While this Section provides examples of accommodations that
should receive a presumption of reasonableness, accommodations that should
receive a presumption of unreasonableness, and accommodations that do not
clearly fit into either category, it is important for courts to decide each case by
examining the specific facts involved.124
A. Presumption of Reasonableness
Certain commuting-related accommodations should be presumptively
reasonable, but courts should allow the employer to rebut this presumption by
showing undue hardship. These accommodations should include “change[s] to a
workplace condition that [are] entirely within an employer’s control and that
would allow the employee to get to work and perform her job,”125 for example,
modified work schedules for employees who seek to avoid night shifts126 and paid
parking spaces for employees who are unable to walk to work at locations with
limited available parking.127

118. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (2012).
119. Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1517 (2d Cir. 1995); Borkowski v. Valley Cent.
Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1995).
120. Lyons, 68 F.3d at 1517; Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 140; see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(i) (providing
that courts should consider “the nature and net cost of the accommodation needed under this part,
taking into consideration the availability of tax credits and deductions, and/or outside funding”).
121. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(ii); Lyons, 68 F.3d at 1516.
122. Lyons, 68 F.3d at 1516; see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(iii) (providing that courts should
consider the type and location of an entity’s facilities).
123. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(2)(iv)–(v).
124. Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 2002 WL 31994335 (E.E.O.C. Guidance Oct. 17, 2002).
125. Colwell v. Rite-Aid, 602 F.3d 495, 505 (3d Cir. 2010).
126. According to EEOC regulations promulgated under the ADA, modified work schedules
are examples of reasonable accommodations. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii). However, for positions
where timeliness is an essential job function, modified work schedules might be unreasonable. As
discussed above, the concept of essential functions is larger than this Note can address.
127. As noted above, the Lyons court upheld a request for a paid parking space on the grounds
that the request could be a reasonable accommodation. Lyons, 68 F.3d 1512; see also Basas, supra note
85, at 90–91 (“Parking can be one of the most cost-effective and easily implemented forms of
transportation-related accommodation for people with disabilities who can drive and have access to
cars.”). In discussing why employers should provide parking spaces when it does not impose undue
hardship, Basas notes that (1) parking can “be a ramp of sorts to the workplace,” (2) parking is
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For modified work schedules, an employer could rebut the presumption of
reasonableness if granting an employee’s shift request would interfere with an
established seniority system.128 In U.S. Airways v. Barnett, the Supreme Court held
that an employer has no obligation to give preference to an employee with
disabilities over qualified individuals with more seniority unless the employee with
disabilities has evidence of special circumstances.129 For example, a court may find
an accommodation unreasonable if granting an employee with disabilities the right
to work only day shifts interferes with a system that rewards senior employees
with the right to pick their shifts or if the employee fails to present evidence of
special circumstances.130
Alternatively, an employer could demonstrate undue hardship if the
employee’s position requires extensive training and could be filled by one
individual on the condition that he or she could work any shift. In this case, the
employer might have to invest much time and money in training a second
employee to work only night shifts, a cost that it could avoid by hiring a single
individual able to work both day and night shifts. Accordingly, the cost of training
a second employee might impose undue hardship on an employer that is relatively
small and financially limited.
B. Generally Unreasonable
On the other hand, some accommodations, including floating start and end
times, should generally be considered unreasonable unless the employee can show
that such accommodations do not modify the essential job functions.131 Since
predictability is often critical to determining schedules and generally necessary for
conducting business,132 most positions require employers to know when
employees will arrive at work.133 However, although floating start and end times
would create unpredictability for employers and would generally be
sometimes part of the employment package that is provided to employees, and (3) parking can be
relatively inexpensive. Id.
128. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 394 (2002); Young-Parker v. AT&T
Mobility Corp., No. 4:09-CV-00202, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114997 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 9, 2009).
129. U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 394. The court noted that special circumstances could include
showing that the employer can unilaterally change the seniority system and does so frequently, so that
employees do not expect the system to be followed. Thus, it seems that merely needing the
accommodation is not enough to overcome the presumption that an accommodation that would
cause an employer to violate a seniority system is unreasonable.
130. However, in its Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the ADA, the EEOC states that
accommodations that merely interfere with other employees’ morale do not create undue hardship.
Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation & Undue Hardship Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 2002 WL 31994335 (Oct. 17, 2002).
131. See Pagonakis v. Express LLC, 534 F. Supp. 2d 453 (D. Del. 2008) (holding an employee’s
requests for late arrivals and early dismissals without penalty unreasonable because they modified the
essential functions of the job).
132. See Salmon v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1162 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
133. See, e.g., Pagonakis, 534 F. Supp. 2d 453; Salmon, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1157.
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unreasonable,134 a court should conduct a fact-specific inquiry into the
circumstances of the case and the costs to the employer before making that
determination.
C. More Difficult Requests
The more difficult cases involve accommodations that impose higher costs,
such as the payment of transportation expenses and the provision of
transportation. The reasonableness of these accommodations depends on an
individual employer’s size and resources. These accommodations may impose less
hardship and therefore be more reasonable for larger employers with more
resources. They may also depend on the salary of the employee and his or her
value to the employer.135
For example, if the employer is a national corporation with many resources,
and if the employee with disabilities lives outside of walking distance but within
several miles of the workplace, then it might be reasonable for the employer to
pay transportation costs because, based on an assessment of the factors listed
above, the accommodation would likely not be an undue hardship.136 Moreover, if
an employee without disabilities lives near the employee with disabilities, then it
might also be reasonable for the employer to pay that employee to drive the
employee with disabilities to and from work.
Courts should generally consider employers’ financial resources in
determining whether a requested accommodation imposes undue hardship.137 But
the undue hardship assessment will necessarily require more information regarding
an employer’s financial situation where the accommodation is more expensive.
Thus, while all inquiries into the reasonableness of an accommodation require an
individualized review, these accommodations will require an even closer, more

134. See, e.g., Pagonakis, 534 F. Supp. 2d 453; Salmon, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1157.
135. See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting
that the ADA’s legislative history equates “undue hardship” to “unduly costly” and that “these are
terms of relation. . . . [p]resumably . . . to the benefits of the accommodation to the disabled worker as
well as to the employer’s resources”). Therefore, an employee must first show that the
accommodation is reasonable “in the sense both of efficacious and of proportional to costs.” Id. If
this showing is met, the employer then has a chance to show that the costs are excessive “in relation
either to the benefits of the accommodation or to the employer’s financial survival or health.” Id. For
instance, an accommodation costing more than the employee’s salary would likely be found to be
unreasonable or, alternatively, to impose undue hardship.
136. See id. (suggesting that the reasonableness of an accommodation depends partly on the
employer’s resources and the cost of the accommodation in proportion to those resources). This
accommodation might impose less hardship if the employer is large and has many resources, and if
the employee lives nearby and therefore needs lower transportation costs. However, it might impose
more hardship if the employer is small and has few resources, and if the employee lives farther away
and thus necessitates higher transportation costs.
137. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2) (2012).
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fact-specific examination because they involve high financial costs and more
resources.
CONCLUSION
In order for Congress to achieve its goal of enabling individuals with
disabilities to keep their jobs, and become productive members of society it is not
enough simply to prohibit discrimination and provide reasonable accommodations
in the workplace. Individuals with disabilities must be able to reach the workplace.
Thus, to fully realize the goals of the ADA, courts should apply a case-by-case
approach to commuting-related accommodations.
Lyons and the ADAAA have set the stage for courts to consider the
reasonableness of commuting-related accommodations on a case-by-case basis. In
Lyons, the court explicitly held that under the ADA, an employer may have an
obligation to assist employees with disabilities in getting to and from work.
Moreover, although the ADAAA did not address the issue of whether driving
constitutes a major life activity and whether the ADA requires commuting-related
accommodations, it reprimanded courts that narrowed the statute’s coverage and
reminded them to construe the ADA more broadly.
Thus, Lyons and the ADAAA provide compelling reasons for courts to
address the reasonableness of commuting-related accommodations through a factspecific inquiry. After the promulgation of the ADAAA, it seems no coincidence
that in 2010, the Third and Ninth Circuits applied a case-by-case approach to hold
that commuting related accommodations may be reasonable under the
circumstances.138 Both courts used a case-by-case approach to reverse a grant of
summary judgment given on the grounds that these accommodations are
automatically outside the scope of employers’ obligations.
In order for individuals with disabilities to achieve their full potential, it is
not enough to provide accommodations inside the workplace if they cannot reach
the workplace. Further, a case-by-case approach is most consistent with the goals
of preventing discrimination on the basis of disability and allowing equal
opportunities for individuals with disabilities. Without a case-by-case approach,
otherwise qualified individuals might be denied a position on the basis of
prejudice. By contrast, a case-by-case approach forces employers to evaluate all
employees on their merits. The case-by-case approach allows employees with
disabilities to access the same employment opportunities as employees without
disabilities.

138. Specifically, the Colwell court cited to Lyons to support the proposition that commutingrelated accommodations may be reasonable under the circumstances. Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602
F.3d 495, 505 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1516 (2d Cir. 1995)). The
Livingston court cited to Colwell to sustain its holding. Livingston v. Fred Meyers, No. 08-35597, 388 F.
App’x 738, 740 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Colwell, 602 F.3d 495 at 506).

